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Abstract
Reciprocating interactions represent a central feature of all human exchanges. They have
been the target of various recent experiments, with healthy participants and psychiatric popu-
lations engaging as dyads in multi-round exchanges such as a repeated trust task. Behaviour
in such exchanges involves complexities related to each agent’s preference for equity with
their partner, beliefs about the partner’s appetite for equity, beliefs about the partner’s model
of their partner, and so on. Agents may also plan different numbers of steps into the future.
Providing a computationally precise account of the behaviour is an essential step towards
understanding what underlies choices. A natural framework for this is that of an interactive
partially observable Markov decision process (IPOMDP). However, the various complexities
make IPOMDPs inordinately computationally challenging. Here, we show how to approxi-
mate the solution for the multi-round trust task using a variant of the Monte-Carlo tree search
algorithm. We demonstrate that the algorithm is efficient and effective, and therefore can be
used to invert observations of behavioural choices. We use generated behaviour to elucidate
the richness and sophistication of interactive inference.
1 Author Summary
Agents interacting in games with multiple rounds must model their partners’ thought pro-
cesses over extended time horizons. This poses a substantial computational challenge that has
restricted previous behavioural analyses. By taking advantage of recent advances in algorithms
for planning in the face of uncertainty, we demonstrate how these formal methods can be ex-
tended. We use a well studied social exchange game called the trust task to illustrate the power
of our method, showing how agents with particular cognitive and social characteristics can be
expected to interact, and how to infer the properties of individuals from observing their be-
haviour.
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2 Introduction
Successful social interactions require individuals to understand the consequences of their ac-
tions on the future actions and beliefs of those around them. To map these processes is a com-
plex challenge in at least three different ways. The first is that other peoples’ preferences or
utilities are not known exactly. Even if the various components of the utility functions are held
in common, the actual values of the parameters of partners, e.g., their degrees of envy or guilt
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], could well differ. This ignorance decreases through experience, and can be
modeled using the framework of a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP).
However, normal mechanisms for learning in POMDPs involve probing or running experi-
ments, which has the potential cost of partners fooling each other. The second complexity is
represented by characterizing the form of the model agents have of others. In principle, agent
A’s model of agent B should include agent B’s model of agent A; and in turn, agent B’s model
of agent A’s model of agent B, and so forth. The beautiful theory of Nash equilibria [7], ex-
tended to the case of incomplete information via so-called Bayes-Nash equilibria [8] dispenses
with this so-called cognitive hierarchy [9, 10, 11, 12], looking instead for an equilibrium solu-
tion. However, a wealth of work (see for instance [13]) has shown that people deviate from
Nash behaviour. It has been proposed people instead model others to a strictly limited, yet
non-negligible, degree [9, 10].
The final complexity arises when we consider that although it is common in experimental eco-
nomics to create one-shot interactions, many of the most interesting and richest aspects of be-
haviour arise with multiple rounds of interactions. Here, for concreteness, we consider the
multi round trust task, which is a social exchange game that has been used with hundreds of
pairs (dyads) of subjects, including both normal and clinical populations [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. This
game has been used to show that characteristics that only arise in multi-round interactions such
as defection (agent A increases their cooperation between two rounds; agent B responds by
decreasing theirs) have observable neural consequences that can be measured using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [19, 14, 20, 21, 22].
The interactive POMDP (IPOMDP) [23] is a theoretical framework that formalizes many of these
complexities. It characterizes the uncertainties about the utility functions and planning over
multiple rounds in terms of a POMDP, and constructs an explicit cognitive hierarchy of models
about the other (hence the moniker ’interactive’). This framework has previously been used
with data from the multi-round trust task [24, 20]. However, solving IPOMDPs is computa-
tionally extremely challenging, restricting those previous investigations to a rather minuscule
degree of forward planning (just two- out of what is actually a ten-round interaction). Our main
contribution is the adaptation of an efficient Monte Carlo tree search method, called partially
observable Monte Carlo planning (POMCP) to IPOMDP problems. Our second contribution is
to illustrate this algorithm through examination of the multiround trust task. We show charac-
teristic patterns of behaviour to be expected for subjects with particular degrees of inequality
aversion, other-modeling and planning capacities, and consider how to invert observed be-
haviour to make inferences about the nature of subjects’ reasoning capacities.
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3 Materials and Methods
We first briefly review Markov decision processes (MDPs), their partially observable extensions
(POMDPs), and the POMCP algorithm invented to solve them approximately, but efficiently.
These concern single agents. We then discuss IPOMDPs and the application of POMCP to
solving them when there are multiple agents. Finally, we describe the multi-round trust task.
3.1 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
𝑠0 
𝑎1 𝑎2 
𝑇(𝑠1, 𝑎1, 𝑠0) 𝑇(𝑠2, 𝑎1, 𝑠0) 𝑇(𝑠2, 𝑎2, 𝑠0) 𝑇(𝑠3, 𝑎2, 𝑠0) 
𝑟1 
𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑠3 
𝑟2 
𝑅(𝑎1, 𝑠0) 
𝑟3 𝑟4 
𝑅(𝑎2, 𝑠0) 
Figure 1: A Markov decision process. The agent starts at state s0 and has two possible actions a1 and
a2. Exercising either, it can transition into three possible states, one of which (s2) can be reached through
either action. Each state and action combination holds a particular reward expectation R(a, s). Based on
this information, the agent can choose an action and transitions with probability T (s, a, s0) to a new state
s, obtaining an actual reward r in the process. The procedure is then repeated from the new state, with its’
given action possibilities or else the decision process might end, depending on the given process.
A Markov decision process (MDP) [25] is defined by sets S of ”states” and A of ”actions”, and
several components that evaluate and link the two, including transition probabilities T , and
information R about possible rewards. States describe the position of the agent in the envi-
ronment, and determine which actions can be taken, accounting for, at least probabilistically,
the consequences for rewards and future states. Transitions between states are described by
means of a collection of transition probabilities T , assigning to each possible state s ∈ S and
each possible action a ∈ A from that state, a transition probability distribution or measure
T assˆ = T (sˆ, a, s) := P[sˆ|s, a] which encodes the likelihood of ending in state sˆ after taking ac-
tion a from state s. The Markov property requires that the transition (and reward probabilities)
only depend on the current state (and action), and are independent from the past events. An
illustration of these concepts can be found in figure 1.
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Figure 2: A partially observable Markov decision process. Starting from a observed interaction history h,
the agents use their belief state B(h), to determine how likely they find themselves in one of three possible
actual states s1, s2, s3. Any solution to the POMDP requires calculating all future action values depending
on all possible future histories and the respective Belief states. Following this, an observation o is obtained
by the agent and the new history {h, a, o} becomes the starting point for the next decision.
By contrast, in a partially observable MDP (i.e., a POMDP [26]), the agent can also be uncertain
about its state s. Instead, there is a set of observations o ∈ O that incompletely pin down
states, depending on the observation probabilities Wasˆo = W(o, a, sˆ) := P[o|sˆ, a]. These report
the probability of observing o when action a has occasioned a transition to state sˆ. See figure 2
for an illustration of the concept.
We use the notation st = s, at = a or ot = o to refer explicitly to the outcome state, action
or observation at a given time. The history h ∈ H is the sequence of actions and observations,
wherein each action from the point of view of the agent moves the time index ahead by 1,
ht := {o0, a0, o1, a1, . . . , at−1, ot}. Here o0 may be trivial (deterministic or empty). The agent
can perform Bayesian inference to turn its history at time t into a distribution P[St = st|ht] over
its state at time t, where St denotes the random variable encoding the uncertainty about the
current state at time t. This distribution is called its belief state B(ht), with PB(ht)[St = st] :=
P[St = st|ht]. Inference depends on knowing T ,W and the distribution over the initial state
S0, which we write as B(h0). Information about rewards R comprises a collection of utility
functions r ∈ R, r : A × S × O → R, a discount function Γ ∈ R,Γ : N → [0, 1] 1 and a
survival function H ∈ R, H : N × N → [0, 1]. The utility functions determine the immediate
gain associated with executing action a at state s and observing o (sometimes writing rt for the
reward following the tth action). From the utilities, we define the reward functionR : A×S → R,
as the expected gain for taking action a at state s asR(a, s) = E[r(a, s, o)], where this expectation
is taken over all possible observations o. Since we usually operate on histories, rather than fixed
states, we define the expected reward from a given history h as R(a, h) :=
∑
s∈S R(a, s)P[s|h].
1A more general definiton would be Γ ∈ R, Γ : H×H → [0, 1], allowing it to be conditional on the precise present
and future histories.
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The discount function weights the present impact of a future return, depending only on the
separation between present and future. We use exponential discounting with a fixed number
γ ∈ [0, 1] to define our discount function:
Γ(τ − t) = γτ−t. ∀τ, t ∈ N, τ ≥ t. (3.1)
Additionally, we define H such that H(τ, t) is 0 for τ > K and 1 otherwise. K in general is
a random stopping time. We call the second component t the reference time of the survival
function.
The survival function allows us to encode the planning horizon of an agent during decision
making: If H(τ, t) is 0 for τ − t > P , we say that the local planning horizon at t is less than or
equal to P .
The policy pi ∈ Π, pi(a, h) := P[a|h] is defined as a mapping of histories to probabilities over
possible actions. Here Π is called the set of admissible policies. For convenience, we sometimes
write the distribution function as pi(h). The value function of a fixed policy pi starting from
present history ht is
V pi(ht) :=
∞∑
τ=t
γτ−tH(τ, t)E[rτ |pi, hτ ] (3.2)
i.e., a sum of the discounted future expected rewards (note that hτ is a random variable here,
not a fixed value). Equally, the state-action value is
Qpi(a, ht) := R(a, ht) +
∞∑
τ=t+1
γτ−tH(τ, t)E[rτ |pi, hτ ]. (3.3)
Definition 1 (Formal Definition - POMDP). Using the notation of this section, a POMDP is defined
as a tuple (S,A,O, T ,W,R,Π,B0) of components as outlined above.
Convention 1 (Softmax Decision Making). A wealth of experimental work (for instance [27, 28, 29])
has found that the choices of humans (and other animals) can be well described by softmax policies based
on the agents’ state-action values, to encompass the stochasticity of observed behaviour in real subject
data. See [30], for a behavioural economics perspective and [11] for a neuroscience perspective. In view of
using our model primarily for experimental analysis, we will base our discussion on the decision making
rule:
pi(a, h) = P[a|h] = e
βQpi(a,h)∑
b∈A eβQ
pi(b,h)
(3.4)
where β > 0 is called the inverse temperature parameter and controls how diffuse are the probabilities.
The policy
pi(a, h) =
{
1 if Qpi(a, h) = max {Qpi(b, h)|b ∈ A} (assuming this is unique)
0 otherwise (3.5)
can be obtained as a limiting case for β →∞.
Convention 2. From now on, we shall denote by Q(a, h), the state-action value Qpi(a, h) with respect
to the softmax policy.
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3.2 POMCP
POMCP was introduced by [31] as an efficient approximation scheme for solving POMDPs.
Here, for completeness, we describe the algorithm; later, we adapt it to the case of an IPOMDP.
POMCP is a generative model-based sampling method for calculating history-action values.
That is, it builds a limited portion of the tree of future histories starting from the current ht,
using a sample-based search algorithm (called upper confidence bounds for trees (UCT); [32])
which provides guarantees as to how far from optimal the resulting action can be, given a
certain number of samples (based on results in [33] and [34]). Algorithm 1 provides pseudo
code for the adapted POMCP algorithm. The procedure is presented schematically in figure 3.
R 
1) SEARCH: Sample 
from beliefs: 
R 
T T 
T 
2) SIMULATE: UCT 
rule. 
R 
T T 
T L 
3) ROLLOUT: value 
estimate at a leaf 
L L 
L L L 
L L 
L L 
R 
T T 
T T L L 
L L 
4) Update & Repeat. New leaf 
nodes added. 
L L 
𝑠~𝔅(ℎ) 
Figure 3: Image of POMCP. The algorithm samples a state s from the Belief state B(h) at the root R (
R representing the current history h), keeps this state s fixed till step 4), follows UCT in already visited
domains (labelled tree nodes T ) and performs a rollout and back update when hitting a leaf (labelled L).
Then step 1)− 4) is repeated until the specified number of simulations has been reached.
The algorithm is based on a tree structure T , wherein nodes T (h) = (N(h), Q˜(h),B(h)) represent
possible future histories explored by the algorithm, and are characterized by the number N(h)
of times history h was visited in the simulation, the estimated value Q˜(h) for visiting h and
the approximate belief state B(h) at h. Each new node in T is initialized with initial action
exploration counts Ninit(h, a) = 0 for all possible actions a from h and an initial action value
estimate Q˜init(h, a) = 0 for all possible actions a from h and an empty belief state B(h) = ∅.
The value N(h) is then calculated from all actions counts from the node N(h) =
∑
a∈AN(h, a).
Q˜(h) denotes the mean of obtained values, for simulations starting from node h. B(h) can
either be calculated analytically, if it is computationally feasible to apply Bayes theorem, or be
approximated by the so called root sampling procedure (see below).
In terms of the algorithm, the generative model G(s, a) of the POMDP determines (s′, o, r) ∼
G(s, a), the simulated reward, observation and subsequent state for taking a at s; s itself is
sampled from the current history h. Then, every (future) history of actions and observations h
defines a node T (h) in the tree structure T , which is characterized by the available actions and
their average simulated action values Q˜(a, h) under the policy SOFTUCT at future states.
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Algorithm 1 Partially Observable Monte Carlo Planning
procedure SEARCH(h , t , n)
for SIMULATIONS = 1, . . . , n do
k ← t
if ht = o0 then
s ∼ B0
else
s ∼ B(ht)
end if
SIMULATE (s, h, t, k)
end for
return a ∼ SOFTUCT
end procedure
procedure ROLLOUT(s,h,t,k)
if H(k, t) ≤ 0 then
return 0
end if
a ∼ pirollout(h, ·)
(s′, o, r) ∼ G(s, a)
h← {h, a, o}
k ← k + 1
return r+γROLLOUT(s′, h, t, k)
end procedure
procedure SIMULATE (s,h ,t , k)
if H(k, t) ≤ 0 then
return 0
end if
if h 6∈ T then
for all a ∈ A do
T (ha)← (Ninit(h, a), Q˜init(a, h), ∅)
end for
return ROLLOUT (s, h, t, k)
end if
a ∼ SOFTUCT
(s′, o, r) ∼ G(s, a)
h← {h, a, o}
k ← k + 1
R← r+γSIMULATE(s′, h, t, k)
N(h)← N(h) + 1
N(h, a)← N(h, a) + 1
Q˜(a, h)← Q˜(a, h) + R−Q˜(a,h)N(h,a)
return R
end procedure
If the node has been visited for the N(h)th time; with action a being taken for the N(h, a)th time,
then the average simulated value is updated (starting from 0) using sampled simulated rewards
R up to terminal time K, when the current simulation/tree traversal ends as:
Q˜new(a, h) = Q˜old(a, h) +
1
N(h, a)
(
R− Q˜old(a, h)
)
. (3.6)
The search algorithm has two decision rules, depending on whether a traversed node has al-
ready been visited or is a leaf of the search tree. In the former case, a decision is reached using
SOFTUCT by defining
SOFTUCT Q(a, h) := Q˜(a, h) + c
√
logN(h)
N(h, a)
P[a|h] = e
β(Q(a,h))∑
b e
β(Q(b,h))
. (3.7)
where c is a parameter that favors exploration (analogous to an equivalent parameter in UCT).
If the node is new, a so-called ”rollout” policy is used to provide a crude estimate of the value
of the leaf. This policy can be either very simple (uniform or −greedy based on a very simple
model) or specifically adjusted to the search space, in order to optimize performance.
The rollout value estimate together with the SOFTUCT exploration rule is the core mechanism
for efficient tree exploration. In this work, we only use an −greedy mechanism, as is described
in the section on the multi round trust game.
Another innovation in POMCP that underlies its dramatically superior performance is called
root sampling. This procedure allows to form the belief state at later states, as long as the initial
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belief state B0 is known. This means that, although it is necessary to perform inference to draw
samples from the belief state at the root of the search tree, one can then use each sample as if it
was (temporarily) true, without performing inference at states that are deeper in the search tree
to work out the new transition probabilities that pertain to the new belief states associated with
the histories at those points. The reason for this is that the probabilities of getting to the nodes
in the search tree represent exactly what is necessary to compensate for the apparent inferential
infelicity [31]– i.e., the search tree performs as a probabilistic filter. The technical details of the
root sampling procedure can be found in [31].
In the presence of analytically tractable updating rules (or at least analytically tractable approx-
imations) the belief state at a new node can instead be calculated by Bayes’ theorem. In the case
for the multi round trust game below, we follow the approximating updating rule in [20].
3.3 Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
An Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (IPOMDP) is a multi agent setting
in which the actions of each agent may observably affect the distribution of expected rewards
for the other agents.
Since IPOMDPs may be less familiar than POMDPs, we provide more detail about them; consult
[23] for a complete reference formulation and [35] for an excellent discussion and extension.
We define the IPOMDP such that the decision making process of each agent becomes a stan-
dard (albeit large) POMDP, allowing the direct application of POMDP methods to IPOMDP
problems.
 𝑆 𝑆
Environment Partner Model
Θ
State Variable
Θ
Partner Model
Full IPOMDP 
from Partners’ 
View
Solution:
ℎ
ℙ[Θ = θ1|ℎ]
ℙ[Θ = θ2|ℎ]
𝑆 × θ1 Solution
𝑆 × θ2 Solution
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Figure 4: Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process. Compared to a POMDP, the process
is further complicated by the necessity to keep different models Θ of the other agents’ intentions, so that
evidence on the correct intentional model may be accrued in the belief state B(h). Any solution to the
IPOMDP requires calculating all future action values depending on all possible future histories and the
respective Belief states.
Definition 2 (Formal Definition - IPOMDP). An IPOMDP is a collection of POMDPs such that the
following holds:
Agents are indexed by the finite set I. Each agent i ∈ I is described by a single POMDP (Si, Ai, Oi,
T i,Wi,Ri ,Πi, Bi0) denoting its actual decision making process. We first define the physical state space
Siphys: an element s ∈ Siphys is a complete setting of all features of the environment that determine the
action possibilities Ai and obtainable rewards Ri of i for the present and all possible following histories,
from the point of view of i. The physical state space Siphys is augmented by the set Di of models of the
partner agents θij ∈ Di, j ∈ I\{i}, called intentional models, which are themselves POMDPs θij=(Sij ,
Aij , Oij , T ij ,Wij , Rij , Πij , Bij0 ). These describe how agent i believes agent j perceives the world and
reaches its decisions. The possible state space of agent i can be written Si = Siphys×Di and a given state
can be written s˜i = (si,×jθij), where si ∈ Siphys is the physical state of the environment and θij are
the models of the other agents. Note that the intentional models θij contain themselves state spaces that
encode the history of the game as observed by agent j from the point of view of agent i. The elements of
Si are called interactive states. Agents themselves act according to the softmax function of history-action
values, and assume that their interactive partner agents do the same. The elements of the definition are
summarized in figure 4.
Convention 3. We denote by capital S and capital S˜ the random variables, that encode uncertainty
about the physical state and the interactive state respectively.
When choosing the set of intentional models, we consider agents and their partners to engage in
a cognitive hierarchy of successive mentalization steps [10, 9], depicted in figure 5. The simplest
agent can try to infer what kind of partner it faces (level 0 thinking). The next simplest agent
could additionally try to infer what the partner might be thinking of it (level 1). Next, the agent
might try to understand their partner’s inferences about the agent’s thinking about the partner
(level 2). Generally, this would enable a potentially unbounded chain of mentalization steps. It
is a tenet of cognitive hierarchy theory [10] that the hierarchy terminates finitely and for many
tasks after only very few steps (e.g., Poisson, with a mean of around 1.5) .
Computational Theory of Mind 
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 
What type 
is our 
partner? 
What 
type do 
they 
think we 
are? 
What type 
do they 
think, we 
think, they 
are? 
Level -1 
We act on an 
impersonal 
environment 
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Figure 5: Computational Theory of Mind (ToM) formalizes the notion of our understanding of other
peoples thought processes.
We formalize this notion as follows.
Definition 3 (A Hierarchy Of Intentional Models). Since models of the partner agent may contain
interactive states in which it in turn models the agent i, we can specify a hierarchical intentional structure
Di,l, built from what we call the level l ≥ −1 intentional models Di,l. Di,l is defined inductively from
θij,−1 ∈ Di,−1 ⇔ Sij,−1 = Sijphys × {∅}.
This means that any level −1 intentional model reacts strictly to the environment, without holding any
further intentional models. The higher levels are obtained as
θij,l ∈ Di,l ⇔ Sij,l = Sijphys ×Dij,l−1.
Here Dij,l−1 denotes the l − 1 intentional models, that agent i thinks agent j might hold of the other
players. These level l − 1 intentional models arise by the same procedure applied to the level −1 models
that agent i thinks agent j might hold.
Definition 4 (Theory of Mind (ToM) Level). We follow a similar assumption as the so called k-level
thinking (see [9]), in that we assume that each agent operates at a particular level li (called the agent’s
theory of mind (ToM) level; and which it is assumed to know), and models all partners as being at level
lj = li − 1.
We chose definition 4 for comparability with earlier work [24, 20].
Convention 4. It is necessary to be able to calculate the belief state in every POMDP that is encountered.
An agent updates its belief state in a Bayesian manner, following an action ait and an observation oit+1.
This leads to a sequential update rule operating over the belief state P[S˜it |hit] of a given agent i at a given
time t:
P[S˜it+1 = s˜1|{hit, ait, oit+1}] = ηW(oit+1, ait, s˜1)
∑
s˜∈Si
T (s˜1, ait, s˜)P[S˜it = s˜|hit]. (3.8)
Here η is a normalization constant associated with the joint distribution of transition and observation
probability, conditional on s˜, s˜1, oit+1 and ait. The observation oit+1 in particular incorporates any results
of the actions of the other agents, before the next action of the given agent.
We note that the above rule applies recursively to every intentional model in the nested structure Di, as
every POMDP has a separate belief state.
This is slightly different from [23] so that the above update is conventional for a POMDP.
Convention 5 (Expected Utility Maximisation). The decision making rule in our IPOMDP treat-
ment is based on expected utility as encoded in the reward function. The explicit formula for the action
value Q(ait, hit) under a softmax policy (equation 3.4) is:
Q(ait, h
i
t) = R(a
i
t, h
i
t) +
∑
oit+1∈O
P[oit+1|{hit, ait}]
∑
b∈Ai
γ(i)H(t+ 1, t)Q(b, hit+1|t)P[b|hit+1]. (3.9)
Here ht+1 = {hit, ait, oit+1} and Q(b, hit+1|t) denotes the action value at t+ 1 with the survival function
conditioned to reference time t. γ(i) is the discount factor of agent i, rather than the i-th power. This
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defines a recursive Bellman equation, with the value of taking action ait given history hit being the expected
immediate reward R(ait, hit) plus the expected value of future actions conditional on ait and its possible
consequences oit+1 discounted by γi.
The belief state B(hit) allows us to link hit to a distribution of interactive states and use W to calculate
P[oit+1|hit, ait], in particular including the reactions of other agents to the actions of one agent. We call
the resulting policy the ”solution” to the IPOMDP.
3.4 Equilibria and IPOMDPs
Our central interest is in the use of the IPOMDP to capture the interaction amongst human
agents with limited cognitive resources and time for their exchanges. It has been noted in [10]
that the distribution of subject levels favours rather low values (e.g., Poisson, with a mean of
around 1.5). In the opposite limit, sufficient conditions are known in which taking the cognitive
hierarchy out to infinity for all involved agents allows for at least one Bayes-Nash equilibrium
solution (part II, theorem II, p. 322 of Harsanyi [8]) and sufficient conditions have been shown
in [36], given which a solution to the infinite hierarchy model can be approximated by the se-
quence of finite hierarchy model solutions. A discussion of a different condition can be found in
[37]; however, this condition does assume a infinite time horizon in the interaction. In general,
as [10], p.868 notes, it is not true that the infinite hierarchy solution will be a Nash equilibrium.
For the purposes of computational psychiatry, we find the very mismatches and limitations, that
prevent subjects’ strategies to evolve to a (Bayes)-Nash equilibrium in the given time frame, to
be of particular interest. Therefore we restrict our attention to quantal response equilibrium like
behaviours ([30]) , based on potentially inconsistent initial beliefs by the involved agents with
ultimately very limited cognitive resources and finite time exchanges.
3.5 Applying POMCP to an IPOMDP
An IPOMDP is a collection of POMDPs, so POMCP is, in principle, applicable to each encoun-
tered POMDP.
However, unlike the examples in [31], an IPOMDP contains the intentional model POMDPs θij
as part of the state space, and these themselves contain a rich structure of beliefs. So, the state
is sampled from the belief state at the root for agent i is an I tuple (sˆi, θˆi1, . . . , θˆi(|I|−1)) of a
physical state sˆi and (|I| − 1) POMDPs, one for each partner. (This is also akin to the random
instantiation of players in [8]). Since the θˆij still contain belief states in their own right, it is still
necessary to do some explicit inference during the creation of each tree. Indeed, explicit infer-
ence is hard to avoid altogether during simulation, as the interactive states require the partner
to be able to learn [23]. Nevertheless, a number of performance improvements that we detail
below still allow us to apply the POMCP method involving substantial planning horizons.
3.6 Simplifications for dyadic repeated exchange
Many social paradigms based upon game theory, including the iterated ultimatum game, pris-
oners’ dilemma, iterated ”rock, paper, scissors” (for 2 agents) and the multi round trust game,
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involve repeated dyads. In these, each interaction involves the same structure of physical states
and actions (Sphys,A) (see below), and all discount functions are 0 past a finite horizon.
Definition 5 (Dyadic Repeated Exchange without state uncertainty). Consider a two agent IPOMDP
framework in which there is no physical state uncertainty: both agents fully observe each others’ actions
and there is no uncertainty about environmental influence; and in which agents vary their play only
based on intentional models and an agent does not believe that the partner can be made to transition
between different intentional models by the agent’s actions. Additionally, the framework is assumed to
reset after each exchange (i.e., after both agents have acted once).
Formally this means: There is a fixed setting (Sphys,A, T ), such that physical states, actions from these
states, transitions in the physical state and hence also obtainable rewards, differ only by a changing time
index and there is no observational uncertainty and an agent does not believe that the partner can be
made to transition between different intentional models by the agent’s actions. Then after each exchange
the framework is assumed to reset to the same distribution of physical initial states S within this setting
(i.e. the game begins anew).
Games of this sort admit an immediate simplification:
Theorem 1 (Level 0 Recombining Tree). In the situation of definition 5, level 0 action values at any
given time only depend on the total set of actions and observations so far and not the order in which those
exchanges were observed.
Proof. The level −1 partner model only acts on the physical state it encounters and the physical
state space variable S is reset at the beginning of each round in the situation of 5. Therefore,
given a state s in the current round and an action a by a level 0 agent, the likelihood of each
transition to some state s1, T (s1, a, s), and of making observation o, W(o, a, s1), is the same at
every round from the point of view of the level 0 agent. It follows that the cumulative belief
update from equation 3.8, from the initial beliefs B0 to the current beliefs, will not depend on
the order in which the action observation pairs (a, o) were observed.
This means, that depending on the size of the state space and the depth of planning of interest,
we may analytically calculate level 0 action values even online or use precalculated values for
larger problems. Furthermore, because their action values will only depend on past exchanges
and not on the order in which they were observed, their decision making tree can be reformu-
lated as a recombining tree.
Sometimes, an additional simplification can be made:
Theorem 2 (Trivialised Planning). In the situation of definition 5, if the two agents do not act simul-
taneously and the state transition of the second agent is entirely dependent on the action executed by the
first agent (as in the multi round trust task); and additionally the intentional model of the partner can
not be changed through the actions of the second agent, then a level 0 second agent can gain no advantage
from planning ahead, since their actions will not change the action choices of the first agent.
Proof. In the scenario described in theorem 2 the physical state variable S of the agent 2 is
entirely dependent on the action of the other agent. If the agent is level 0, they model their
partner as level −1 and by additional assumption the second agent does not believe that the
partner can be made to transition between different intentional models by the second agent’s
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actions, hence their partner will not change their distribution of state transitions, depending
on the agents’ actions and hence also their distribution of future obtainable rewards will not
change.
Theorem 3 (Trivialised Theory of Mind Levels). In the situation of theorem 2, we state that for the
first to go agent only the even theory of mind levels k ∈ {0}∪2N show distinct behaviours, while the odd
levels k ∈ 2N− 1 behave like one level below, meaning k − 1. For the second to go partner equivalently,
only the odd levels k ∈ {0} ∪ 2N− 1 show distinct behaviours.
Proof. In the scenario described in theorem 2, the second to go level 0 agent behaves like a level
−1 agent, as it does not benefit from modeling the partner. This implies that the first to go agent,
gains no additional information at the level 1 thinking, since the partner behaves like level −1,
which was modeled by the level 0 first to agent already. In turn, the level 2 second to go agent
gains no additional information over the level 1 second to go agent, as the their partner model
does not change between modeling the partner at level 0 or level −1. By induction, we get the
result.
Examples of the additional simplifications in theorems 2 and 3 can be seen in the ultimatum
game and the multi round trust game.
3.7 The Trust Task
Multi Round Trust Game 
• 21 possible investor 
actions 
• 3*(amount of 
investment) +1 possible 
conditional trustee 
responses 
• 631 possible distinct 
exchanges per turn 
• Hence the size of the 
whole decision making 
tree initially is 631^10  
 
At every Step: 
20 
Investor Trustee 
3 x Investment 
Repayment 
For 10 consecutive rounds 
with the same partner: 
Figure 6: Physical features of the multi round trust game.
The multi-round trust task, illustrated in figure 6 is a paradigm social exchange game. It in-
volves two people, one playing the role of an ’investor’ the other the one of a ’trustee’, over 10
sequential rounds, expressed by a time index t = 1, 2, . . . , 10. Both agents know all the rules
of the game. In each round, the investor receives an initial endowment of 20 monetary units.
The investor can send any of this amount to the trustee. The experimenter trebles this quan-
tity and then the trustee decides how much to send back to the investor, between 0 points and
the whole amount that she receives. The repayment by the trustee is not increased by the ex-
perimenter. After the trustee’s action, the investor is informed, and the next round starts. We
consider the trust task as an IPOMDP with two agents, i.e., I = {I, T} contains just I for the
investor and T for the trustee. We consider the state to contain two components; one physical
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and observable (the endowment and investments), the other non-physical and non-observable
(in our case, parameters of the utility function). It is the latter that leads to the partial observ-
ability in the IPOMDP. Following [24], we reduce complexity by quantizing the actions and the
(non-observable) states of both investor and trustee – shown for one complete round in figure
7. The actions are quantized into 5 fractional categories shown in figure 7. For the investor,
we consider aI ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (corresponding to an investment of $20×aI , and encom-
passing even investment ranges). For the trustee, we consider aT ∈ {0, 0.167, 0.333, 0.5, 0.67}
(corresponding to a return of $3×20×aIaT , and encompassing even return ranges). Note that
the trustee’s action is degenerate if the investor gives 0. The pure monetary payoffs for both
agents in each round are
investor :χI(aI , aT ) = 20− 20aI + 3× 20aIaT .
trustee :χT (aI , aT ) = 3× 20aI − 3× 20aIaT .
The payoffs of all possible combinations and both partners are depicted in figure 8. In IPOMDP
terms, the investor’s physical state is static, whereas the trustee’s state space is conditional
on the previous action of the investor. The investor’s possible observations are the trustees
responses, with a likelihood that depends entirely on the investor’s intentional model of the
trustee. The trustee observes the investor’s action, which also determines the trustee’s new
physical state, as shown in figure 9.
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Figure 7: Investor: (left) The 21 possible actions are summarized into 5 possible investment categories.
Trustee: ( right) returns are classified into 5 possible categories, conditionally on investor action. Impossi-
ble returns are marked in black.
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Figure 8: Payoffs in the multi round trust task. (left) Investor payoffs for an single exchange. (right)
Trustee payoffs for an single exchange.
𝑆𝐼 = 𝑠0
𝐼  Starting State: 
𝑎𝐼 = 0 𝑎𝐼 = 0.25 𝑎𝐼 = 0.5 𝑎𝐼 = 0.75 𝑎𝐼 = 1 
Possible 
Actions: 
Trustee 
States : 
Observe Trustee 
Responses: 
Final State: 𝑆𝐼 = 𝑠0
𝐼  
𝑠0
𝑇 𝑠1
𝑇 𝑠2
𝑇 𝑠3
𝑇 𝑠4
𝑇 
𝑜𝐼 = 𝑎𝑇 
Starting State: 
Possible 
Actions: 
𝑠0
𝑇 𝑠1
𝑇 𝑠2
𝑇 𝑠3
𝑇 𝑠4
𝑇 
𝑎𝑇 = 𝑜𝐼 
Investor 
State: 𝑆𝐼 = 𝑠0
𝐼  
𝑎𝐼 = 0 𝑎𝐼 = 0.25 𝑎𝐼 = 0.5 𝑎𝐼 = 0.75 𝑎𝐼 = 1 
Final 
State : 𝑠0
𝑇 𝑠1
𝑇 𝑠2
𝑇 𝑠3
𝑇 𝑠4
𝑇 
Observe Investor 
(𝑜𝑇 = 𝑎𝐼): 
Figure 9: (Physical) Transitions and Observations: (left) Physical state transitions and observations of
the investor. The trustee’s actions are summarized to aT , as they can not change the following physical
state transition. (right) Physical state transitions and observations of the trustee. The trustee’s actions are
summarized to aT , as they can not change the following physical state transition.
3.7.1 Inequality Aversion - Compulsion to Fairness
The aspects of the states of investor and trustee that induce partial observability are assumed to
arise from differential levels of cooperation.
15
Investor Utility, Guilt 0 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Trustee Utility, Guilt 0 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Investor Utility, Guilt 0.4 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Trustee Utility, Guilt 0.4 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Investor Utility, Guilt 1 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Trustee Utility, Guilt 1 −
 During one Exchange
Fraction returned by Trustee
Fr
a
ct
io
n 
se
nt
 b
y 
In
ve
st
or
0 1/6 2/6 3/6 4/6
0
0.
25
0.
5
0.
75
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Figure 10: Immediate Fehr-Schmidt utilities for a single exchange [1]. Left column shows investor pref-
erences: (top left) Completely unguilty investor values only the immediate payoff, (middle left) Guilt 0.4
investor is less likely to keep everything to themselves (bottom left corner option), (bottom left) Guilt 1
investor will never keep everything to themselves (bottom left option). Right column shows trustee pref-
erences: (top right) unguilty trusty would like to keep everything to themselves. (middle right) Guilt 0.4
is more likely to return at least a fraction of the gains. (bottom right) Guilt 1 trustee will strife to return the
fair split always.
One convenient (though not unique) way to characterize this is via the Fehr-Schmidt inequality
aversion utility function (figure 10). This allows us to account for the observation that many
trustees return an even split even on the last exchange of the 10 rounds, even though no further
gain is possible. We make no claim that this is the only explanation for such behaviour, but
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it is a tractable and well-established mechanism that has been used successfully in other tasks
([27, 1, 18] ). For the investor, this suggests that:
rI(aI , aT , αI) = χI(aI , aT )− αI max{χI(aI , aT )− χT (aI , aT ), 0}. (3.10)
Here, αI is called the ”guilt” parameter of the investor and quantifies their aversion to unequal
outcomes in their favor. We quantize guilt into 3 concrete guilt types {0, 0.4, 1} = {α1, α2, α3}.
Similarly, the trustee’s utility is
rT (aI , aT , αT ) = χT (aI , aT )− αT max{χT (aI , aT )− χI(aI , aT ), 0}, (3.11)
with the same possible guilt types. We choose these particular values, as guilt values above
0.5 tend to produce similar behaviours as α = 1 and the values below 0.3 tend to behave very
similar to α = 0. Thus we take α1 to represent guilt values in [0, 0.3], α2 to represent guilt values
in (0.3, 0.5) and α2 to represent guilt values in [0.5, 1]. We assume that neither agents’ actual
guilt type changes during the 10 exchanges.
3.7.2 Planning Behaviour
The survival functions HI and HT are used to delimit the planning horizon. The agents are
required not to plan beyond the end of the game at time 10 and within that constraint they are
supposed to plan P steps ahead into the interaction. This results in the following form for the
survival functions (regardless whether for investor or trustee):
HP (τ, t) = 1, (τ − t) ≤ P ∧ (τ + t) ≤ 10, HP (τ, t) = 0, (τ − t) > P ∨ (τ + t) > 10. (3.12)
The value P is called the planning horizon. We consider P ∈ {0, 2, 7} for immediate, medium
and long planning types. We chose these values as P = 7 covers the range of behaviours from
P = 4 to P = 9, while planning 2 yields compatibility to earlier works ([24, 20]) and allows to
have short planning but high level agents, covering the range of behaviours for planning P = 1
to P = 3. We confirm later that the behaviour of P = 7 and P = 9 agents is almost identical;
and the former saves memory and processing time. Agents are characterized to assume their
opponents have the same degree of planning as they do. The discounting factors γI and γT are
set to 1 in our setting.
3.8 Belief State
Since all agents use their own planning horizon in modeling the partner and level k agents
model their partner at level k− 1, inference in intentional models in this analysis is restricted to
the guilt parameter α. Using a categorical distribution on the guilt parameter and Dirichlet prior
on the probabilities of the categorical distribution, we get a Dirichlet-Multinomial distribution
for the probabilities of an agent having a given guilt type at some point during the exchange.
Hence B0 is a Dirichlet-Multinomial distribution ,
B0 ∼ DirMult(a0), a0 = (1, 1, 1)
with the initial belief state
P[αpartner = αi|h = ∅] = 1
3
.
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Keeping consistent with the model in [20], our approximation of the posterior distribution
is also a Dirichlet-Multinomial distribution with the parameters of the Dirichlet prior being
updated to
ait+1 = a
i
t + P[ot+1 = observed action|αpartner = αi]. (3.13)
writing αpartner for the intentional models.
3.8.1 Theory of Mind Levels and Agent Characterization
Since the physical state transition of the trustee is fully dependent on the investors’ action and
one agents’ guilt type can not be changed by the actions of the other agent, theorem 2 implies
that the level 0 trustee is trivial, gaining nothing from planning ahead. Conversely, the level 0
investor can use a recombining tree as in theorem 1. Therefore, the chain of cognitive hierarchy
steps for the investor is lI ∈ {0}∪{2n|n ∈ N}, and for the trustee, it is lT ∈ {0}∪{2n−1|n ∈ N}.
Trustee planning is trivial until the trustee does at least reach theory of mind level 1. Assuming
β = 13 in 3.4, determined empirically from real subject data [20] for suitably noisy behaviour, our
subjects are then characterized via the triplet (k, α, P ) of theory of mind level k, guilt parameter
α ∈ {0, 0.4, 1} and planning horizon P ∈ {0, 2, 7}.
3.9 Level −1 and POMCP rollout mechanism
The level−1 models are obtained by having the level −1 agent always assume all partner types
to be equally likely (P[αpartner = αi] = 13 ,∀i), setting the planning horizon to 0, meaning the part-
ner acts on immediate utilities only, and calculating the agent’s expected utilities after marginal-
izing over partner types and their respective response probabilities based on their immediate
utilities.
In the POMCP treatment of the multi round trust game, if a simulated agent reaches a given his-
tory for the first time, a value estimate for the new node is derived by treating the agent as level
−1 and using an -greedy decision making mechanism on the expected utilities to determine
their actions until the present planning horizon.
4 Results
We adapted the POMCP algorithm [31] to solve IPOMDPs [23], and cast the multi-round trust
task as an IPOMDP that could thus be solved. We made a number of approximations that
were prefigured in past work in this domain [24, 20], and also made various observations that
dramatically simplified the task of planning, without altering the formal solutions. This allowed
us to look at longer planning horizons, which is important for the full power of the intentional
modeling to become clear.
Here, we first seek to use this new and more powerful planning method to understand the
classes of behaviour that arise from different settings of the parameters in section 4.3. From
the study of human interactions [14], the importance of coaxing (returning more than the fair
split) has been established. From our own study of the data collected so far, we define four
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coarse types of ’pure’ interactions, which we call ”Cooperation”, ”Coaxing to Cooperation”,
”Coaxing to Exploitation”, ”Greedy” ; we conceptualize how these might arise. We also delimit
the potential consequences of having overly restricted the planning horizon in past work in
this domain, and examine the qualitative interactive signatures (such as how quickly average
investments and repayments rise or fall) that might best capture the characteristics of human
subjects playing the game.
We then continue to discuss the quality of statistical inference, by carrying out model inversion
for our new method in section 4.7 and comparing to earlier work in this domain [24].
Finally, we treat real subject data collected for an earlier study ([20]) in section 4.9 and show that
our new approach recovers significant behavioural differences not obtained by earlier models
and offers a significant improvement in the classification of subject behaviour through the in-
clusion of the planning parameter in the estimation and the quality of estimation on the trustee
side.
The materials used in this section, as well as the code used to generate them, can be found
on Andreas Hula’s github repository. All material was generated on the local WTCN cluster.
We used R [38] and Matlab [39] for data analysis and the boost C++ libraries [40] for code
generation.
4.1 Modalities
All simulations were run on the local cluster at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging.
For sample paths and posterior distributions, for each pairing of investor guilt, investor sophis-
tication and trustee guilt and trustee sophistication, 60 full games of 10 exchanges each were
simulated, totaling 8100 games. Additionally, in order to validate the estimation, a uniform mix
of all parameters was used, implying a total of 2025 full games.
To reduce the variance of the estimation, we employed a pre-search method. Agents with ToM
greater than 0 first explored the constant strategies (offering/returning a fixed fraction) to obtain
a minimal set of Q˜ values from which to start searching for the optimal policy using SOFTUCT.
This ensures that inference will not ”get stuck” in a close-to-optimal initial offer just because
another initial offer was not adequately explored. This is more specific than just increasing
the exploration bonus in the SOFTUCT rule, which would diffuse the search during all stages,
rather than helping search from a stable initial grid.
We set a number n of simulations for the initial step, where the beliefs about the partner are still
uniform and the time horizon is still furthest away. We then reduce the number of simulations
as the time horizon approaches (n, n 910 , n
8
10 , . . . , n
1
10 ) .
4.2 Simulation And Statistical Inference
Unless stated otherwise, we employ an inverse temperature in the softmax of β = 13 (noting
the substantial scale of the rewards). The exploration constant for POMCP was set to c = 25.
The initial beliefs were uniform ai = 1,∀i, for each subject. For the 3 possible guilt types we
use the following expression while in text: α = α1 is ”greedy”, α = α2 is ”pragmatic” and
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α = α3 is ”guilty”. However, on all the graphs, we give the exact model classification in the
form I : (kI , αI , P I) for the investor and T : (kT , αT , PT ) for the trustee.
We present average results over multiple runs generated stochastically from each setting of the
parameter values. In the figures, we report the actual characteristics of investor and trustee;
however, in keeping with the overall model, although each agent knows their own parameters,
they are each inferring their opponents’ degree of guilt based on their initial priors.
As a consequence of the observation in section 3.8.1, we only consider k ∈ {0, 2} for the investor
and k ∈ {0, 1} for the trustee. Planning horizons are restricted to P ∈ {0, 2, 7}, as noted in
section 3.7, with the level 0 trustee always having a planning horizon of 0.
Actions for both agents are parametrized as in section 3.7 and averaged across identical pa-
rameter pairings. In the graphs, we show actions in terms of the percentages of the available
points that are offered or returned. For the investor, the numerical amounts can be read di-
rectly from the graphs; for the trustee, these amounts depend on the investor’s action. In the
figures, we report the actual characteristics of investor and trustee; however, in keeping with the
overall model, although each player knows their own parameters, they are each inferring their
opponents’ degree of guilt based on their initial priors.
Dual to generating behaviour from the model is to invert it to find parameter settings that best
explain observed interactions [24, 20]. Conceptually, this can be done by simulating exchanges
between partners of given parameter settings (k, α, P ), taking the observed history of invest-
ments and responses, and using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure which finds the
settings for both agents that maximise the chance that simulated exchanges between agents
possessing those values would match the actual, observed exchange. We calculate the action
likelihoods through the POMCP method outlined in the earlier section 3.2 and accumulate the
negative log likelihoods, looking for the combination that produces the smallest negative log-
likelihood. This is carried out for each combination of guilt and sophistication for both investor
and trustee.
4.3 Paradigmatic Behaviours
Figures 11 (with the additional outcome comparison in figure 12), and figures 13 and 14 show
the three characteristic types of behaviour, in each case for two sets of parameters for investor
and trustee. The upper graphs show the average histories of actions of the investor ( blue) and
trustee (red) across the 10 rounds; the middle graphs show the mean posterior distributions
over the three guilt parameters (0, 0.4, 1) as estimated by the investor and the lower graphs
show the mean posterior distribution by the trustee (right) at four stages in the game (rounds
0, 3, 6 and 9). These show how well the agents of each type are making inferences about their
partners.
Figure 11 shows evidence for strong cooperation between two agents who are characterized by
high inequity aversion (i.e., guilty). Cooperation develops more slowly for agents with shorter
(left) than longer (right) planning horizons, enabling a reliable distinction between different
guilty pairs. This is shown more explicitly in figure 12 in terms of the total amount of money
made by both participants. Both cases can be seen as cases of a tit for tat like approach by
the players, although unlike a strict tit for tat mechanism the process leading to high level
cooperation is generally robust against following below par actions by either player. Rather,
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high level players would employ coaxing to reinforce cooperation in this case. This is true
even for lower level players, as after they have formed beliefs of the partner, they will not
immediately reduce their offers upon a few low offers or returns, due to the Bayesian updating
mechanism.
The posterior beliefs show both partners ultimately inferring the other’s guilt type correctly in
both pairings, however the P I = 7 investors remain aware of the possibility that the partners
may actually be pragmatic and therefore the high level long horizon investors are prone to
reduce their offers preemptively towards the end of the game. This data feature was noted in
particular in the study [20] and our generative model provides a generative explanation for it,
based on the posterior beliefs of higher level agents explained above.
Figure 13 shows that level 1 trustees employ coaxing (returning more than the fair split) to get
the investor to give higher amounts over extended periods of time. In the example settings, the
level 0 investor completely falls for the trustee’s initial coaxing (left), coming to believe that the
trustee is guilty rather than pragmatic until towards the very end. However, the level 2 investor
(right) remains cautious and starts reducing offers soon after the trustee gets greedy, decreasing
their offers faster than if playing a truly guilty type. The level 2 investor on average remains
ambiguous between the partner being guilty or pragmatic. Either inference prevents them from
being as badly exploited as the level 0 investor.
In these plots, investor and trustee both have long planning horizons; we later show what
happens when a trustee with a shorter horizon (PT = 2) attempts to deceive.
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Figure 11: Averaged Exchanges (upper) and posteriors (mid and lower). Left plots: Investor
(kI , αI , P I) = (2, 1, 2); Trustee (1, 1, 2); right plots: Investor (2, 1, 7) and Trustee (1, 1, 7). The posterior
distributions are shown for α = (0, 0.4, 1) at four stages in the game. Error bars are standard deviations.
The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
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Figure 12: Average Overall gains for the exchanges in figure 11, with planning 2 (dark blue) and 7 (light
blue). The difference is highly significant (p < 0.01) at a sample size of 60 for both parameter settings.
Error bars are standard deviations.
A level 1 trustee can also get pragmatic investors to cooperate through coaxing, as demonstrated
in figure 14. The returns are a lot higher than for a level 0 guilty trustee, who lacks a model of
their influence on the investor, and hence does not return enough to drive up cooperation. This
initial coaxing is a very common behaviour of high level healthy trustees, trying to get the
investor to cooperate more quickly, for both guilty and pragmatic high level trustees.
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Figure 13: Averaged Exchanges (upper) and posteriors (mid and lower). Left plots: Investor
(kI , αI , P I) = (0, 1, 7); Trustee (1, 0.4, 7); right plots: Investor (2, 1, 7) and Trustee (1, 0.4, 7). The posterior
distributions are shown for α = (0, 0.4, 1) at four stages in the game. Error bars are standard deviations.
The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
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Figure 14: Average Exchanges (upper) and posteriors (mid and lower), Investor (0, 0.4, 7) and Trustee
(1, 1, 7). The posterior distributions are shown for α = (0, 0.4, 1) at four stages in the game. Error bars are
standard deviations. The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
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4.4 Inconsistency or Impulsivity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
.0
0
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
I:(ToM 0, G: 1, P: 2)                                     
At Step
Fr
ac
tio
n 
se
nt
 to
 pa
rtn
er
                                    T:(ToM 1, G: 0.4, P: 2)
0 3 6 9
Partner has guilt 0
Partner has guilt 0.4
Partner has guilt 1
I:(ToM 0, G: 1, P: 2) Inference 
 about T:(ToM 1, G: 0.4, P: 2)
At Step
Be
lie
f o
n 
Pa
rtn
er
 G
uil
t
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
* * * *
0 3 6 9
Partner has guilt 0
Partner has guilt 0.4
Partner has guilt 1
T:(ToM 1, G: 0.4, P: 2) Inference 
 about I:(ToM 0, G: 1, P: 2)
At Step
Be
lie
f o
n 
Pa
rtn
er
 G
uil
t
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
*
* * *
Figure 15: Average Exchanges (upper) and posteriors (mid and lower), Investor (0, 1, 2) and Trustee
(1, 0.4, 2). The posterior distributions are shown for α = (0, 0.4, 1) at four stages in the game. Error bars
are standard deviations. The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
Trustees with planning horizon 2 tend to find it difficult to maintain deceptive strategies. As
can be seen in figure 15, even when both agents have a planning horizon of 2, a short sighted
trustee builds significantly less trust than a long sighted one. This is because it fails to see
sufficiently far in the future, and exploits too early. This planning horizon thus captures cogni-
tive limitations or impulsive behaviour, while the planning horizon of 7 generally describes the
consistent execution of a strategy during play. Such a distinction may be very valuable for the
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study of clinical populations suffering from psychiatric disorders such as attention deficit hy-
peractivity disorder (ADHD) or borderline personality disorder (BPD), who might show high
level behaviours, but then fail to maintain them over the course of the entire game. Inferring
this requires the ability to capture long horizons, something that had eluded previous methods.
This type of behaviour shows how important the availability of different planning horizons is
for modeling, as earlier implementations such as [24] would treat this impulsive type as the
default setting.
4.5 Greedy Behaviour
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Figure 16: Averaged Exchanges (upper) and posteriors (mid and lower). Left plots: Investor
(kI , αI , P I) = (0, 0, 7); Trustee (1, 0, 7); right plots: Investor (2, 0, 7) and Trustee (1, 0, 7). The posterior
distributions are shown for α = (0, 0.4, 1) at four stages in the game. Error bars are standard deviations.
The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
Another behavioural phenotype with potential clinical significance arises with fully greedy
partners, see figure 16. Greedy low level investors only invest very little, even if trustees try
to convince them of a high guilt type on their part as described above (coaxing). Cooperation
repeatedly breaks, which is reflected in the high variability of the investor trajectory. Two high
level greedy types initially cooperate, but since the greedy trustee egregiously over-exploits, co-
operation usually breaks down quickly over the course of the game, and is not repaired before
the end. In the present context, the greedy type appears quite pathological in that they seem
to hardly care at all about their partners’ type. The main exception to this is the level 2 greedy
investor (an observation that underscores how theory of mind level and planning can change
behaviour that would seem at first to be hard coded in the inequality aversion utility function).
The level 0 greedy investor will cause cooperation to break down, regardless of their beliefs, as
in figure 16 the posterior beliefs of the level 0 show that they believe the trustee to be guilty, but
do not alter their behaviour in the light of this inference.
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4.6 Planning Mismatch - High Level Deceived By Lower Level
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Figure 17: Average Exchanges, Investor (2, 1, 2) and Trustee (1, 0.4, 7). Error bars are standard deviations.
The asterisk denotes the true partner guilt value.
In figure 17, the investor is level 2, and so should have the wherewithal to understand the
level 1 trustee’s deception. However, the trustee’s longer planning horizon permits her to play
more consistently, and thus exploit the investor for almost the entire game. This shows that
the advantage of sophisticated thinking about other agents can be squandered given insuffi-
cient planning, and poses an important question about the efficient deployment of cognitive
resources to the different demands of modeling and planning of social interactions.
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4.7 Confusion
4.7.1 Model Inversion
A minimal requirement for using the proposed model to fit experimental data is self-consistency.
That is, it should be possible to recover the parameters from behaviour that was actually gener-
ated from the model itself. This can alternatively be seen as a test of the statistical power of the
experiment - i.e., whether 10 rounds suffice in order to infer subject parameters. Figure 18 shows
the confusion matrix which indicates the probabilities of the inferred guilt (top), ToM (middle)
and planning horizon (bottom) for investor (left) and trustee (right), in each case marginalizing
over all the other factors. We discuss a particular special case of the obtained confusion in 19.
Said confusion relates to observations made in empirical studies (see [19, 20]) and suggests the
notion of the planning parameter, as measure of consistency of play. Later, we show compar-
ative data reported in the study [24], which only utilized a fixed planning horizon of 2 and 2
guilt states (and did not exploit the other simplifications that we introduced above), see figure
20 for a depiction of the levels of confusion in that study. These simplifications implied that the
earlier study would find recovery of theory of mind in particular to be harder.
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Figure 18: Percentage of inferred guilt , theory of mind and planning horizon for investor (left) and trustee
(right) as a function of the true values, marginalizing out all the other parameters. Each plot corresponds
to a uniform mix of 15 pairs per parameter combination and partner parameter combination.
Guilt is recovered in a highly reliable manner. By contrast, there is a slight tendency to overes-
timate ToM in the trustees. The greatest confusion turns out to be inferring a P I = 7 investor as
having P I = 2 when playing an impulsive trustee (PT = 2), a problem shown more directly in
Figure 19.
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Figure 19: Maximum likelihood estimation result, P I = 7 and PT = 2 agent combinations, marginalized
maximum likelihood estimation of investor planning horizon over all other parameters.
The issue is that when the trustee is impulsive, far-sighted investors (P I = 7) can gain no advan-
tage over near-sighted ones (P I = 2), and so the choices of this dyad lead to mis-estimation. Al-
ternatively put, an impulsive trustee brings the investor down to his or her level. This has been
noted in previous empirical studies, notably [19, 20]’s observations of the effect on investors of
playing erratic trustees. The same does not apply on the trustee side, since the reactive nature
of the trustee’s tactics makes them far less sensitive to impulsive investor play.
Given the huge computational demands of planning, it seems likely that investors could react
to observing a highly impulsive trustee by reducing their own actual planning horizons. Thus,
the inferential conclusion shown in figure 19 may in fact not be erroneous. However, this pos-
sibility reminds us of the necessity of being cautious in making such inferences in a two-player
compared to a one-player setting.
4.7.2 Confusion Comparison to earlier Work
We compare our confusion analysis to the one carried out in the grid based calculation in [24].
In [24] the authors do not report exact confusion metrics for the guilt state, only noting that it
is possible to reliably recover whether a subject is characterized by high guilt (0.7) or low guilt
(0.3). We can however compare to the reported ToM level recovery. The comparison with [24]
faces an additional difficulty in that despite using the same formal framework as this present
work, the indistinguishability of the level 1 and 2 trustees and the level 0 and 1 investors was not
identified yet. This explains the somewhat higher amount of confusion when classifying ToM
levels, reported in [24]. Also, since calculation of the Dirichlet-Multinomial probability was
done numerically in this study, some between level differences will only derive from changes
in quadrature points for higher levels. As can be seen in figure 20 (left), almost all of the level
1 trustees at low guilt are misclassified. This is due to them being classified as level 2 instead,
since both levels have the same behavioral features, but apparently the numerical calculation
of the belief state favored the level 2 classification over the level 1 classification. The tendency
to overestimation is true on the investor side as well, with there being a considerable confusion
between level 0 and level 1 investors, who should behaviorally be equivalent. In sum, this leads
to the reported overestimation of the theory of mind level. We have depicted the confusion
levels reported in [24] in figure 20.
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Figure 20: Classification probability reported in [24]. In analogy to figure 18 we depict the generated vs
estimated values in a matrix scheme.
4.8 Computational Issues
The viability of our method rests on the running time and stability of the obtained behaviours.
In figure 21, we show these for the case of the first action, as a function of the number of simu-
lation paths used. All these calculations were run at the local Wellcome Trust Center for Neu-
roimaging (WTCN) cluster. Local processor cores where of Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge)
type clocked at 2.2 GHz and no process used more than 4 GB of RAM. Note that, unless more
than 25k paths are used, calculations take less than 2 minutes.
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Figure 21: (left) Average running times for calculating the first action value of a level 2, guilt 1 investor
from a given number of simulations, as a function of planning horizon (complexity). (right) Discrepancy
to the converged case of the action probabilities for the first action measured in squared discrepancies.
We quantify simulation stability by comparing simulations for a level 2 investor (a reasonable
upper bound, because the action value calculation for this incorporates the level 1 trustee re-
sponses) based on varying numbers of paths with a simulation involving 106 paths that has
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converged. We calculate the between (simulated) subject discrepancies C of the probabilities
for the first action for P I ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}:
Cij =
1
119
120∑
k=1
(Pk[aI0 =
i
4
]− Pˆ[aI0 =
i
4
])(Pk[aI0 =
j
4
]− Pˆ[aI0 =
j
4
]) i, j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
where Pˆ[aI0 = i4 ] are the converged probabilities, and P
k[aI0] is the action likelihood of simu-
lated subject k. If the sum of squares of the entries in the discrepancy matrix is low, then the
probabilities will be close to their converged values.
As can be seen from figure 21 (right), for 25k paths even planning 9 steps ahead agents have
converged in their initial action probabilities, such that their action probabilities vary from the
converged value by no more than about 0.1. However, note that this convergence is not always
monotonic in either the planning horizon or the number of sample paths. The former is influ-
enced by the differing complexity of preferences for different horizons – sometimes, actions are
harder to resolve for short than long horizons. The latter is influenced by the initial pre-search
using constant strategies.
Although 25k steps suffice for convergence even when planning 9 steps ahead, this horizon
remains computationally challenging. We thus considered whether it is possible to use a shorter
horizon of 7 steps, without materially changing the preferred choices. Figure 22 illustrates that
the difference is negligible compared with the fluctuations of the Monte Carlo approach, even
for the worst case involving the pairing of 2 pragmatic types, with high ToM levels and long
planning horizons. At the same time, the calculation for P = 7 is twice as fast as P = 9 for the
level 2 investor, which even just for the first action is a difference of 100 seconds.
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Figure 22: Average Exchanges, Investor (2, 0.4, 7) (dark blue) and Trustee (1, 0.4, 7) (red), as well as
Investor (2, 0.4, 9) (light blue) and Trustee (1, 0.4, 9) (rose). The difference between the 2 planning horizons
is not significant at any point. Error bars are standard deviations.
Finally we compare our algorithm at planning 2 steps ahead to the grid-based calculation used
before [24, 20]. The speed advantage is a factor of 200 for 104 paths in POMCP demonstrating
the considerable improvement that enables us to consider longer planning horizons.
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4.9 Comparison To Earlier Subject Classifications
We will show below, using real subject data taken from [20], that our reduction to 3 guilt states
does not render likelihoods worse and only serves to improve classification quality. We com-
pared the results of our new method with the results obtained in earlier studes ([24], [20]).
4.9.1 Dataset
We performed inference on the same data sets as in Xiang et al,[20] (which were partially
analysed in [24],[14] and [15]). This involved 195 dyads playing the trust game over 10 ex-
changes. The investor agent was always a healthy subject, the trustees comprised various
clinical groups, including anonymous, healthy trustees (the ”impersonal” group; 48 subjects),
healthy trustees who were briefly encountered before the experiment (the ”personal” group; 52
subjects), trustees diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) (the ”BPD” group; 55
subjects), and anonymous healthy trustees matched in socio-economic status (SES) to the (lower
than healthy) SES distribution of BPD trustees, (the ”low SES” group; 38 subjects).
4.9.2 Models Used
We compared our models to the results of the model used in [20] on the same data set (which
incorporates the data set used in [24]). The study [20] uses 5 guilt states {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}
compared to our 3, a planning horizon of 2 and an inverse temperature of 1, otherwise the for-
mal framework is exactly the same as in section 3.7. Action values in [20] were calculated by
an exact grid search over all possible histories and a numerical integration for the calculation of
the belief state. For comparison purposes we built a ”clamped” model in which the planning
horizon was fixed at the value 2, with 3 guilt states and a inverse temperature set to β = 13 . Ad-
ditionally, we compared to the outcome for the full method in this work, including estimation
of the planning horizon. We noted that in the analysis in [20], an additional approximation had
been made at the level 0 investor level, which set those investors as non learning. This kept
their beliefs uniform and yielded much better negative loglikelihoods within said model, than
if they were learning.
4.9.3 Subject Fit
A minimal requirement to accept subject results as significant is that the negative log likelihood
is significantly better than random on average at p < 0.05, otherwise we would not trust a
model based analysis over random chance and the estimated parameters would be unreliable.
This criterion is numerically expressed as a negative loglikelihood of 16.1 for 10 exchanges,
calculated from 5 possible actions at a probability of 0.2 each, with independent actions each
round.
For the analysis in [20], we found that the special approximation made in [20] allowed for sig-
nificantly better negative log likelihoods (mean 11.98); if this approximation is removed, the
investor data fit at an inverse temperature of 1 would be worse than random for this data set.
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Additionally, the model used in [20] did not fit the trustee data significantly better than random
at p < 0.05 (mean negative loglikelihoods 15.6 and standard deviation of > 3).
Conversely, for both our clamped and full model analysis at β = 13 , the trustee likelihood is
significantly better than random (11.7 at the full model) and the investor negative loglikelihood
is slightly better on average (smaller) than found in [20] with 5 guilt states (11.7 for our method,
vs 11.98). This confirms that reducing the number of guilt states to 3 only reduces confusion
and does not worsen the fit of real subjects data. Additionally, it becomes newly possible to
perform model-based analyses on the BPD trustee guilt state distribution, since the old model
did not fit trustees significantly better than random at p < 0.05.
The seemingly low inverse temperature at β = 13 is a consequence of the size of the rewards and
the quick accumulation of higher expectation values with more planning steps, as the inverse
temperature needs to counter balance the expectation size to keep choices from becoming nearly
deterministic. Average investor reward expectations (at the first exchange) for planning 0 steps
stand at 18 with an average 18 being added at each planning step.
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Figure 23: Parameter Distributions for different models on the data set of [20]. (upper left) Investor ToM
distribution is significant (p < 0.05) between the impersonal control condition and all other conditions.
(upper right) Trustee Guilt distribution is significant between impersonal controls and the BPD trustees.
(middle left) Planning 2 investor ToM distribution with 3 guilt states. BPD and low SES differences to
impersonal are significant. (middle right) Planning 2 trustee guilt, the difference between BPD trustees
and impersonal controls is significant. (bottom left) Full planning model investor ToM, all differences to
impersonal are significant. (bottom right) Full planning model trustee guilt. BPD trustees are significantly
different from controls. The asterisk denotes a significant (p < 0.05) difference in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
two sample test, to the impersonal control group.
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4.9.4 Marginal Parameter Distributions -Significant Features
Figure 23 shows the significant parameter distribution differences (Kolmogorov-Smirnov two
sample test, p < 0.05). For investor theory of mind and trustee guilt distribution, many of the
same differences are significant for the analysis reported in [20] (see Fig. 23, upper panels),
for an analysis using our model with a ”clamped” planning horizon of 2 steps ahead (see Fig.
23, middle panels, to match with the approach of [24]) and for our full model, using 3 guilt
states, ToM level up to 2 and 3 planning horizons (see Fig. 23, bottom panels and Fig. 24).
We find significantly lowered ToM in most other groups, compared to the impersonal control
group. We find a significantly lowered guilt distribution in BPD trustees, however the guilt
difference was not used for fMRI analysis in [20], because, as noted above, the trustee was
not fit significantly better than random at p < 0.05 in the earlier model. For our full model
with 3 planning values, we find additional significant differences on the investor side: While
all ToM distributions are significantly different from the impersonal condition, the planning
difference between the personal and impersonal conditions is not significant at p < 0.05, while
it is significant for the other groups (see Fig. 24). Thus, this is the only model keeping the
parameter distribution of the personal group distinct from both the impersonal group (from
which it is not significantly different in the clamped model) and the low SES playing controls
and BPD playing controls (from which it is not significantly different based on the parameters
in [20]) at the same time.
This supports the planning horizon as a ”consistency of play” and additional rationality mea-
sure, as the subjects do not think about possible partner deceptions as much in the personal
condition, having just met the person they will be playing (resulting in lowered ToM). How-
ever, their play is non disruptive, if low level, and consistent exchanges result. BPD and low
SES trustees however disrupt the partners’ play, lowering their planning horizon.
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Figure 24: Planning distribution for Investors, distinguished between personal condition controls (non
significant) and BPD and low SES trustees (significantly lower than impersonal). The asterisk denotes a
significant (p < 0.05) difference in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test, to the impersonal control
group.
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5 Discussion
We adapted the Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm designed for partially observable Markov
decision processes [31] to the interactive, game-theoretic, case [23]. We provide significant sim-
plifications to the case of dyadic social exchange, which benefit any IPOMDP based method. We
illustrated the power of this method by extending the computationally viable planning horizon
in a complex, multi-round, social exchange game to be able to encompass characteristic be-
haviours that have been seen in human play [14].
We also showed that the 10 rounds that had been used empirically suffice to license high quality
inference about parameter values, at least in the case that the behaviour was generated from
the model itself. We exhibited three fundamental forms of dynamical behaviour in the task:
cooperation, and two different varieties of coaxing. The algorithm generates values, state-action
values and posterior beliefs, all of which can be used for such methods as model-based fMRI.
We find that the results in 4.4, 4.6 and figures 19 and 24 confirm the planning horizon as a
consistency of play parameter, that encodes the capability of a subject to execute a consistent
strategy throughout play. As such it may be disrupted by the behavior of shorter planning
partners, as can be seen in 19 and 24.
Furthermore, comparing to earlier data used in the work [20] we can confirm the relevance of
the planning parameter in the treatment of real subject data, classifying subject groups along
the new axis of consistency of play.
The newly finer classification of subjects along the three axes of theory of mind, planning hori-
zon and guilt (k, P, α) should provide a rich framework to classify deficits in clinical popula-
tions such as an inability to model other people’s beliefs or intentions, ineffective model-based
reasoning, and a lack of empathy. Such analyses can be done at speed, of the order of 10s of
subjects per hour.
One might ask whether the behavioural patterns derived in this work might be obtained with-
out invoking the cognitive hierarchy and instead using a large enough state space, which en-
codes the preferences and sophistication of the other agent as many separate states, rather than
a few type parameters plus the cognitive hierarchy. This is in principle possible, however we
prefer ToM for 2 reasons: Firstly, the previous study [20] and others have found neural support
for the distinction between high ToM and low ToM subjects in real play, suggesting that this
distinction is not but a mathematical convenience (cf. [20], p.4 and 5 for a neural representa-
tion of prediction errors associated to level 0 and level 2 thinking). Secondly, we can specify
features of interest, such as inequality aversion and planning at the lowest level, then generate
high level behaviours in a way that yields an immediate psychological interpretation in terms
of the mentalization steps encoded in the ToM level.
The algorithm opens the door to finer analysis of complicated social exchanges, possibly allow-
ing optimization over initial prior values in the estimation or the analysis of higher levels of
theory of mind, at least on tasks with lower fan-out in the search tree. It would also be possible
to search over the inverse temperature β.
One important lacuna is that although it is straightforward to use maximum likelihood to search
over fixed parameters (such as ToM level, planning horizon or indeed temperature), it is radi-
cally harder to perform the computations that become necessary when these factors are incorpo-
rated into the structure of the intentional models. That is, our subjects were assumed to make
39
inferences about their opponent’s guilt, but not about their theory of mind level or planning
horizon.
It is possible that additional tricks would make this viable for the trust task, but it seems more
promising to devise or exploit a simpler game in which this would be more straightforward.
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